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Egypt's policy on higher education, Richards  ment in the 1970s and 1980s, the quality of
argues, must take account of the realities of  education deteriorated seriously. Classes are too
declining government budgets and employment  big and resources are scarce for anything but
and increasing reliance on the private sector,  professorial salaries (which remain low), so
which must become more competitive intema-  learning amounts to little more than memoriza-
tionally. Education in Egypt must increase  tion and repetition. The system does not foster
Egyptians' ability to cope with economic  the development of synthesizing, problem-
disequilibria: to respond quickly and effectively  solving, or creative thinking abilities. And with
to changing technological and market opportuni-  tertiary institutions overenrolled, academic
ties.  success requires the use of tutors, whose fees are
beyond the reach of students of modest means.
The Government of Egypt's  strategy for
achieving this goal is to stabilize the number of  The Government is trying to improve
university students and raise the quality of  conditions by stabilizing university enrollments,
instruction. This fundamentally sound strategy,  expanding the role of two- and four-year techni-
pursued since the mid-1980s, has required  cal institutes, increasing the use of pedagogical
considerable courage of policymakers.  materials in university instruction, and promot-
ing several innovative interdisciplinary programs
Policymakers are struggling to correct a  that stress problem-solving and applied work.
longtime, inequitable misallocation of educa-
tional resources - including an overenrolled  The job guarantee has effectively been
university system combined with a persistently  suspended since the early  1980s, but students
high rate of illiteracy.  have responded slowly to changing signals from
the labor market, because being a university
The Nasser regime greatly expanded higher  graduate is socially prestigious and presumed to
education and guaranteed jobs to university  increase one's chances of marrying well.
graduates. As a result of rapidly growing enroll-
ThePolicy Research Working PaperSeriesdisseminates  thefindingsofwork  under way in theBank. Anobjectiveoftlh  series
is to get these fimdings  out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTABLE OF CONTENTS
Page  NQ.
Executive Summary ............................... ,  i
. 'The Context:
Egypt's Development Strategy for the 1990s  ...........................  1
IL  History of Higher Education  ............  ..................  6
HI.  Performance and Its Deteiminants
-Quantities  .11
-Quality and Internal Efficiency .....................  12
-External Efficiency .15
-Equity  ......................................................  18
-Summary: Determinants of Performance .20
IV.  Concluion:  Responses and Reforms
-Thie Government  ..............................................  22
-Employers  ....  . ...............................................  23
-Students ............................................  23
-Universities  ............................................  24
References  ............................................  25
Statistical Annex
Table  1 : Higher Educational Enrollments ......................  27
Table  2:  Higher Education Graduates  ........................  28
Table  3:  Number of Students Passing the General
Secondary Exam  ...........  ......................  29
Table  4:  Technical School Enrollments ........................  30
Table  5 : Graduates from Technical Institutes ...................  31
Table  6:  Spending on Higher Education .......................  32
Table  7:  Government Employment ..........................  33
Table  8:  Educational Characteristics of the Unemployed  .....  .....  34
Table  9:  Share of Higher Educational Spending in
Total Educational Spending  ........................  35
Table 10:  Female Enrollment in Universities ....................  36
Box 1: University Exams: The Cases of Economics
and Geology  ............................................  37
Box 2: Some Innovative Responses to the Quality
Problem  ..............................................  39EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE CONTEXT: EGYPrS  DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE  1990s
1.  The role and development  of Egypt's  higher education system  are placed in the
context  of the country's  current  economic  development  problems  and strategy.  Historical  background
to  the problems and development of the higher education system is provided.  The principal
quantitative  and qualitative  developments  of higher education are then presented; internal and
external  efficiency  and equity  of the current  system  are briefly  analyzed.  The report concludes  with
a review  of the principal responses  to these p,roblems  by government,  employers,  students, and
aniversities.
2.  The main macro-imbalances  and micro-distortions  of the Egyptian economy  are
briefly  outlined,  with particular  reference  to the labor  market.  Because  of the "tvin gaps"  (between
domestic  savings  and investment,  and between  imports  and exports),  Egypt  has accumulated  a very
large  foreign  debt. Investment  has been biased towards  non-traded  goods,  and had a strong  capital-
intensity  bias. Consequently,  the country is ill-equipped  to  take advantage of its comparative
advantage,  and job creation has been seriously  retarded. Since the labor force ga-wth rate is now
2.7% per year and is accelerating,  this is an especially  serious  problem.  Employment  creation  and
the production  of tradeables  are further  retarded by  high  inflation,  in turn largely  caused  by the very
large  govemment  deficits  (typically  around  20%  of GDP).  Egypt  in the 1990s  faces  a period  of severe
structural  adjustment.
3.  The main consequences  for the labor market and for higher education are: 1)
government  spending  must fall; this increases  the urgency  of more efficient  allocation  of resources
within  the educational  system;  2) government,  one of the main  sources  of job creation  between  1973
and 1985,  can no longer play  this role; 3) the country  must embark  on a strategy  of manufactured
export-led  growth  to solve  the problems  of trade and employment  which  implies:  4) a greater role
for the private secor, and 5) the development  of "the ability  to deal with disequilibria",  or raising
the quality  of human  capital,  specifically,  by increasing  problem-solving  ability.
4.  The fundamental strategy for highei education  which  can complement the wider
development  strategy  is to reduce the quantities  of university  students  in order to raise the quality
of instruction:  "better  fewer,  but better".  Policy  makers  have  been implementing  such  a strategy  since
the mid-1980s, taking initiatives which have required considerable courage.- ii  -
HISTORY OF HIGHER  EDUCATION
5.  Many of Egypt's educational problems have deep historical roots. In common with
most 'plantation  societies", the ancien regime (c.1840-1952)  did little to foster the development of
human c.  ital. British indirect rule, budgetary stringency,  and demand for obedient civil  servants did
little to improve matters. Criticisms  voiced over fifty  years ago (e.g., of students' tendency simply to
memorize and regurgitate information) have a curiously modern ring. The first universities were
raised on a very narrow social base, and the social demand for education as a path to govermnent
employment had already been well established by mid-century.
6.  The fundamental  institutions and problems of the higher education system were
created by the government of Gamal Abd-el-Nasser (1952-1970).  The educational system as a whole
expanded rapidly, with growth in secondary and university  enrollments being especially rapid. Higher
education was offered free of charge, and in 1964  the govefnment guaranteed a govemnment  job to
any university graduate. A very large wedge was thus driven between the private and social returns
to higher education. The explosion of secondary school enrollments in the 1960s set the stage for
extremely rapid increase in university  enrollments in the 1970s.  The latter increased nearly 3.5 times
between 1971 and 1984,  with most of the growth occurring in the 1970s.
7.  The percentage of science students steadily declined even as enrollments soared: the
universities turned out ever-larger number of graduates with poor job prospects. The government
partially concealed this probiem by rapidly inflating the number of persons in the bureaucracy and
(until 1980) in public sector enterprises. By 1982/83  government employment was three times higher
than it was at the height of Nasser's "Arab Socialism",  1966.
8.  The flood of students into the universities in the 1970s and early 1980s led to  a
serious deterioration  in the quality of instruction. The problem was compounded by large scale
emigration of professors to the capital-surplus oil exporting nations, which offered salaries as much
as fifteen times higher than those in Egypt.
9.  Beginning in the early 1980s, the government of Egypt began to respond to these
problems. It suspended de  Xfacto  the job guarantee; it began to limit enrollment in universities; it
raised faculty salaries and  . to foster greater  reliance on  problem-solving abilities. However,
serious budget constraints l  .*  hampered achieving  objectives.
III. PERFORMANCE AND ITS DETERMINANTS
10.  The quantitative development of the higher education system may be summarized as
follows: 1) university enrollments grew at over 14% per  year between 1971 and  1977; 2) growth- iii  -
decelerated during 1977-84  to 5.4% per year, 3) after 1984 er-1l1ments declined, falling from a peak
of nearly 650,000  to 567,000 in 1989; 4) most enrollment gro*&.i  was in the humanities: the share of
sciences students fell from 55% in 1971 to just over 25% in 1989; 5) the government has attempted
to channel the ever-increasing  numbers of successful  secondary school leavers into two year technical
schools. Founded in 1973, their enrollments now stand at over 100,000.
11.  Real resources for higher education grew steadily throughout the 1980s.  The share
of higher education spending in total educational spending has also risen. Unfortunately, however,
these increases have been entirely absorbed by raising faculty salaries. Although this was necessary,
it has left very little money available for libraries, labs, and other materials, which are necessary if
university education is to break out of its "memorize-and-regurgitate"  mode.
12.  This mode  is the  main quality problem in higher education. The causes of this
problem include the legacy of the kuttab (Quranic schools), the high student/faculty ratios at all
levels of the educational system, the absence of materials, the training system for teachers, and the
fact that few problem-s'ulving  skills are required in the government bureaucracy.
13.  Although university administrators are valiantly attempting to remedy this situation,
they face an up-hill struggle in a structural adjustment context. Further, the MOHE has no discretion
over the allocation of spending between faculty salaries and other categories of spending, since it
receives 'line item" budgets from the Ministry of Finance. The competence of the latter Ministry to
make educational decisions is very dubious.
14.  The system  suffers from serious external inefficiencies.  The government job guarantee
and the anti-employment policy matrix of the last twenty years has seriously impeded the creation
of non-public sector employment. Yet the continued absorption of graduates into the bureaucracy
has become  unsustainable; the wage bill constitutes about one-third of  all government current
expenditure. The total wage bill has been reduced by cutting public sector wages and by ceasing to
hire  new personnel. This  has reduced  the private  return  to  higher education,  further eroded
administrative effectiveness, and forced much of the adjustment onto  new labor market entrants,
especially the young and educated. The share of the latter in total, measured unemployment has
increased dramatically over the past several decades.
15.  The responsiveness  of prospective university  students to these changing market signals
has, however, been reduced by several factors. First, the government remains de jure responsible for
employing graduates, despite the de facto suspension of the job guarantee. This has led to some
dubious employment schemes, such as allocating reclaimed land to  (non-agricultural) university
graduates, which continue  to  signal young people  and  their  families that  "the government will
provide". Second, in Egypt as elsewhere, the demand for higher education shifts counter-cyclically:
as job  prospects worsen throughout  the economy, the opportunity  cost of attending  university
declines. Third, holding a university  degree confers high social status, and is especially important in- iv  -
the 'marriage market". This latter force may be changing very slowly  among some classes of society,
and it is hoped that the strong demand for skilled labor will further erode the "effendi syndrome",
the desire of all to shun manual labor.
16.  The fundamental equity problem of higher education is that too many resources are
allocated to his sub-sector at the expense of primary education. Since the percentage of secondary
sr iool enrollments is lower among rural youth, such implicit subsidies also have an "urbFa-  bias".
Some progress has been made in increasing the proportion of young women in the universities.
17.  The educational system is further biased against the poor through the system of
"tutorials", in which private tutors greatly improve the chances of obtaining a high mark on  the
General Secondary Exam, and therefore, of entering the university,  particularly its more prestigious
faculties such as medicine. In common with many countries, the higher education system in Egypt
reproduces existing social inequalities.
18.  In  light of the  above, many have suggested charging "users' fees" or tuition  for
universities and/or the creation of private universities (there is one such university in the country at
preset).  These proposals have so far  been blocked by m-ddle-class interests, and by a fear of
political back-lash. It  is also impeded by the  unflattering popular perception  of  governmental
competence: many fear that scholarships, which would be necessary to ensure access to education
for the poor-but-talented, would in fact be allocated to those with "connections'.
19.  In summary, the supply of quality higher education is sharply constrained by large
class sizes, low faculty salaries which encourage absenteeism and moon-lighting,  and the inadequacy
of extra-classroom materials. The demand  for higher education remains vey  strong despite the
declining remuneration of public employees and the very long queues for governme;.L  jobs because
of the absence of fees, the continued de jure job guarantee, the depressed state of the labor market,
and the continuing high social prestige of a university degree.
IV CONCLUSION: POLICIES AND RESPONSES
20.  Government responses include: reducing the growth of the universities by raising the
scores  required  to  pass  the  GSE,  increasing budgetary  allocations to  higher  education,  and
suspending the job  guarantee. De jure suspension of the latter would further reduce the wedge
between the social and the perceived private return to higher education. Policy has done  little to
increase the equity of the system; proposals to "target" higher education would, if effective, have this
effect. The fundamental deficiency of government policy toward higher education is the absence of
adequate reform of those macro and miceoeconomic  policies which continue to retard job creation
in the private sector, especially the traded goods sectors.v
21.  Private employers have few formal linkages  with the universities.  Although the private
university does soonsor "job fairs", the public universities have yet to follow, perhaps because the
Ministry of Labor technically retains a monopoly on all job placements. Informal private sector
employers, of course, rely on word-of-mouth and family networks for recruitment. Although many
university graduates  are  employed  in  this sector, this  is usually because  they lack any viable
alternative.
22.  Studints  have responded slowly  to the changing labor market signals. There is little
evidence that the d.-mand for higher education has slackened appreciably.
23.  In  addition  to  attempts  to  raise faculty salaries, universities have created  some
innovative interdisciplinary programs which seeks to foster the kind of practical, problem solving
skills which Egypt will need if the economic strategy of manufactured export-led growth is to be
successful during the coming decade.I.  THE CONTEXT:  EGYPT'S  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGY  FOR THE 1990s'
1.  The role and development  of Egypt's  higher  education  system  must be placed  in the
context of the country's current economic  development ;roblems and the strategy which the
government  is implementing  to confront  these  difficulties.  Accordir.  gly,  this  report begins  with a brief
overview  of problems  and strategies,  with a special  focus  on the la 'or market.  The second  section
provides  historical  background  to the development  and current problems  of the higher education
system. The principal quantitative  and qualitative  developments  of higher education are then
presented;  internal  and external  efficiency  and equity  of the current  system  are briefly  analyzed.  The
paper concludes  with  a review  of the principal  responses  to the problems  by government,  employers,
students,  and universities.
2.  The Egyptian economy  is characterized  by serious macro-imbalances  and micro-
distortions.  These  have not only  generated  a large  foreign  debt, but have also  seriously  impeded  the
rate of growth  of the demand for labor. This,  in turn, has driven  down real wages  and increased
unemployment.  Both have contributed to a probable increase in poverty  since the mid-1980s;
unemployment  is increasingly  concentrated  among  young  people  with  education,  including  university
graduates. The employment  problem  is particularly  severe since  the labor force is growing  by 2.7%
per year.' Given Egypt's resource endowment,  a development  strategy which focuses  on labor-
intensive  manufactured  exports  has the best chance  of remedying  this serious  situation.  One should
ask how  the higher  education  system  can the system  provide  the kind of human capital  which  such
a strategy  will  require.
3.  The core  of Egypt's  macroeconomic  problems  is the "twin  gaps' between  investment
and domestic  savings,  and imports  and exports.  These difficulties  are compounded  by a third gap,
that between government  spending  and revenue.  The savings/investment  gap grew throughout  the
1980s,  reaching  12%  of GDP in 1986/87.  S. ings, in particular,  have  collapsed:  public  sector  savings
declined and oil revenues  dwindled,  and public  sector companies,  enjoined  to hire and forbidden
to fire for roughly  two  decades,  accumulated  losses,  which  in the late 1980s  were about 8% of GDP.
Recorded private sector savings  available  to the economy  were and are reduced by negative  real
interest rates on Egyptian  pound deposits.
4.  Desp.te the high investment  ratio, most investment  went into (admittedly  badly
det?riorated) infrastructure,  rather than traded goods production  which  received  perhaps  45% of
investment from  1982-87.  The  relative neglect of  investmen: in  traded  goods, especially
manufacturing  (which  received  less than 20% of all investment)  did little to foster exports and to
create jobs. More seriously  still, investment  had a strong  capital-intensity  bias: 'COR (incremental
*  I would  like  to thank  Jamil  Saimi  for his  helpful  comments  on  an  earlier  draft.
' Unless  otherwise  stated,  all  numbers  In  this  section  ar^  official  Central  Bank  statistics.capital to output ratio) rose from about 2.5 in FY 1976-81  to 6.5 in FY 1984-88,  vwile tbhe  capital-to-
labor ratio rose at just under 15% per year from 1975 to 1985 (Handoussa, 1991). A country with
a rapidly growing labor force and increasingly  scarce capital increasingly  utilized the scarce factor
at the expense of the abundant one. The seriously deleterious employment conseq.dences  of such
developments are considered below (paragraphs 1.12-1.13).
5.  The weaknesses in the volume and pattern o' investment contributed t.  the second
gap, that of the balance of trade. Impo:ts were roughly 2.5 to 3 1imes  larger than commodity experts
throughout the 1980s.  The recent decline in the trade gap has been entirely due to the compression
of imports rather  than to any significant improvement in export performance. Since roughly two-
thirds of  Egyptian imports are  intermediate  and capital  goods, the current  ievel of imports is
unsusta;nably low: export performance must improve.
6.  a-port developments during the 1980s  were dominated by the decline in the value
of petroleum sales, which fell from $2.9 billion in 1983 to $1.36 billion in 1987. The share of oil in
total exports fell from 70% in 1983 to just under 50% in 1987.  Other trade.i goods failed to take up
the slack  created by the decline of oil. Although Egypt experienced the usual problems of the Dutch
Disease during the oil boom, the end of the boom brought no relief. .igricultural exports continued
to deteriorate, with cotton export volume in 1990 only about one-third that of the early 1980s. In
1987 the agricultural trade deficit stood at about $2.8 billion, or roughly one-third of the total trade
deficit. Industrial exports fared only slightly  better. Textiles and related products account for some
60% of such exports; these and other expanding industrial exports (e.g., aluminum) enjoy substantial
subsidies.
7.  Invisible earnings fared better. Tourism grossed over $2 billion per year on the eve
of the Gulf Crisis, and provided the only really bright area of the Egyptian economy in the late
1980s.  Workers' remittances out-performed most predictions in the late 1980s; however, the violent
repatriation  of Egyptians from  Iraq, the country with the largest number  of Egyptians working
abroad, in the fall of 1989 was a harbinger of the future. In December, 1990, the GOE estimated
that some 400,000  Egyptians had returned from the Kuwait and Iraq in the wake of the C(ulf  Crisis.
Such returnees increase the already considerabk  burden of job creation, and, of course, could no
longer contribute their remittances to domestic savings.
8.  In the final analysis,  Egypt plugged its twin gaps by borrowing from abroad. On the
eve of the Gulf Crisis. the total debt was roughly $50 billion; the debt to GDP ratio, if valued at the
free market exchange rate, was 150%, the highest ratio in the world. Despite debt relief inspired by
the Gulf Crisis,  if the underlying problems of the twin gaps are not solved, the debt will  simply  start
to grow again--assuming  willing creditors can still be found. A strategy must be found to increase
exports, increase domestic savings, and channel investment into traded goods sectors.-3-
9.  The twin gaps have been exacerbated by a third gap, the government deficit. Although
the size of the deficit has been reduced, it remained unsustainably high at  16-17% of GDP in
1988/89.2  At least 40% of the deficit is financed by the banking system; the deficit is thvrufore a
major source of  inflation, now conservatively estimated  at  25% per  year. Inflation. of  course,
heightens uncertainty, further distorts  price signals, engenders negative real  interest  rates, and
complicates managenient of the foreign exchange rate.
10.  A few details of some aspects of how the GOE has tried to cut the budgetary deficit
are relevant to the situation of the higher education sub-sector. First, because of the inelasticity  of
revenues with respect to incomes and their heavy reliance on oil, most adjustment has fallen on
spending. Most of latter, in turn, is composed of subsidies, public sector salaries, interest on the
public debt,  and the military. The  first two have been protected, forcing most adjustment onto
subsidies and public sector salaries. Rather than reduce the government wage bill through lay-offs,
the GOE has chosen to reduce real spending on ptublic  sector salaries by freezing nominal wages and
new hires. (Such policies also reduce employment through attrition and retirement). Real wages in
the public sector fell to 55% of their 1973 level by 1989. Two consequences follow: 1) adjustment
costs are  concentrated  on  new entrants  to  the job  market  (including those matriculating from
institutions of higher education) and 2) the decline in government salaries has reduced the relative
economic attractiveness of such employment.
11.  Micro-economic distortions reinforce these macto-imbalances. Egyptian prices bear
little relation to scarcities,  and price distortions react synergistically  with the regulatory environment
to create a producers' nightmare. For the higher education sub-sector, the most significant  example
of this baleful interaction is the increasing capital intensity of production. Partly this phenomenon
has been caused by price distortions: the relative price of labor to capital rose as labor emigration
pushed up wages while accelerating inflation and financial regulations engendered strongly negative
real interest rates. Regulations exacerbate the problem: Individual lay-offs must be reviewed by a
tri-partite  (management,  labor, government) committee, whose ruling is advisory. However, an
employee has appeal rights, and for group lay-offs, the committee's ruling is binding. (World Bank,
1990b). Legally  the government has a monopoly on all job placements outside of agriculture and the
informal sector. It follows that all hiring for the kind of well-paying  jobs with a future which most
university  graduates seek (e.g., in the private formal sector), must be done through the government.
In practice, private companies can and do hire either through "head-hunting" agencies or through
informal  networks  of  personnel  managers.  Nevertheless, these  cumbersome  and  inefficient
regulations reduce the flexibility  of the labor market by converting labor, the "variable  cost" example
of every elementary economics textbook, into overhead. As Hansen has pointed out, such a complex
of forces has created the paradoxical situation of Egyptian producers using too much capital and
labor (Hansen, 1991).
2 In flscal 1989/90,  the government  claimed  that the deficit had fallen  to 7% of GDP;  however,  In 1990/91,  it returned
to former levels  of some 17%..4-
12.  Policies  which  retard the level  and rate of growth  of demand  for labor  have  extremely
serious  consequences  in a countly  with significant  un- and underemployment  and a rapidly  growing
labor force.  Regardless  of fuiure developments  with  respect to Egypt's  external  debt, the 1990s  are
likely  to be dominated by the problem of job creation. Because of a "mini-baby  boom" in the
aftermath  of the October  WUar  of 1973,  the growth  of the labor force  in Egypt  will  actually  accelerate
during tne cor .ng decade. Simply  providing  jobs for rnew  labor market entrants will require the
creation  of an additional  4.5 million  jobs in the 1990s.  (ILO, 1991).  If current unemployment  rates
(perhaps  10-15%)  are to be reduced,  if wom.en's  labor force  participation  is  to rise above  its current
low level (12% in 1986),  and if (as is now happening),  political  events force large numbers of
Egyptians  working  abroad  to return, then the number  of new  jobs needed could  be nearly  9 million.
Given  that the current labor  force  is  about 14-15  million,  this  is an almost  unbelievably  daunt;ng  task.
13.  The picture is not brightened  when one realizes  that as much as 90% of all jobs
created from 1976 to 1986  came from emigration  and the expansion  of government  employment
(Handoussa.  1988).  3 Given  budgetary  deficits  and iegional  developmnents,  neither of these sources
can continue  to expand  at anything  like  the previous  rate. For various  reasons,  the agricultural  sector
iF most unlikely  to create many new  jobs in the coming  decade (Richards,  1991).  Accordingly,  QnlJ
a strategy  of nManifactured  export-led  growth  has a chance  of solvig the employment  problenm  in
Ev.  Such a strate,,- will  require an expanded  role for the private sector, simply  because of the
latter's greater flexibility  in  responding to  rapidly changing intemational market conditions.
Developments  in the higher education  sub-sector  should  be judged on the basis of how  well  they
contribute  to the development  of such a strategy.
14.  A  strategy  of labor-intensive,  manufactured  exports,  with  a greater role for the private
sector can both reduce the twin gaps and simultaneously  create many  jobs. To summarize  the
argument of this introduction,  such a strategy makes sense both because of Egypt's resource
endowment,  and because  of the origins  of the current problems.  The latter are, as sketclied  above,
the result of macroimbalances  and wicrodistortions.  These, in turn, have been generated by the
previous  strategy  of state-led,  import-substituting  industrialization.  This cannot meet the challenge
of jobs and growth  in the 1990s.  Egypt  must increase  savings,  reduce  consumption,  increase,  exports,
and raise efficiency,  while maintaining a minimal "social  safety net" to preserve domestic peace and
stability.  The economy  must become  more dynamic  and competitive;  such considerations,  together
with Egyp's relative  paucity  of natural resources  and abundant  labor,  strongly  suggest  a strategy  of
private-sectos  led manufactured  export growth.
3 The  predse  percentage Is highly  sensitive  to the (widoiy  varying)  estimate of migration. For domestic  job creation
alone,  the  public  sector  generated  some  1,235.000jobs  or  55.8%.  It  we  assume  that  net  emigration  from  1976  wes  1.25
million,  then  the  public-sector-plus-migration  share  of  job  creation  b.toween  the  two  census  years  was  about  70%--stiii
the  large  majority  of new  jobs.-5-
15.  Implementing such a strategy  requires policy  reforms, which,  in turn, have impiications
for human capital formation in general and for the higher education sub-sector in particular. The
er.sentials of  the  needed  "reform package" are well-known: cut the  budget deficit by reducing
govemment employment, targeting  consumer subsidies,  eliminating  energy  subsidies  and all producer
subsidies. This would lower inflation, thereby raising real interest rates (nominal rates should also
rise) and lessen the difficulties of maintaining a realistic exchange rate. The exchange rate should
be unified, so that all remaining subsidies are explicit. Competition must increase by unifying  and
lowering tariff rates and reducing quantity restrictions. Micro-distortions should be eliminated as
quickly as possible, and the regulatory environment must be  radically reformed to promote  the
growth of private manufacturing. 4
16.  The human capital  implications of  the new strategy and  the reforms needed  to
implement it may be sketched here. Above all, the basic health  nd education of the mass of the
population  need  to  be  extended  and  strengthened.  Egyptian policy makers of the  1980s have
important achievements to their credit in this area. For example, infant mortality rates declined from
120 per 1000 live births in 1980 to 83 in 1989; primary school enrollment rates rose from 89% for
boys and 63% for girls in 1980 to 100% and 79%, respectively,  in 1986-88.  However, such gains are
threatened  by increasingly  tight budgets and continued misallocation of educational resources, in
which higher levels of education receive more funds than lower levels,  despite the higher social rate
of return to primary education.
17.  Such  quantitative improvements,  while  laudable, conceal a continuing problem of poor
educational quality.  An export-led growth strategy requires flexibility,  creativity, and an analytical
cast of mind.  In the modern, highly competitive international economy, the "ability to deal with
disequilibria" identified by T.W. Schultz (1971) as the main economic contribution of education,
becomes more important than ever. Far too often, such skills and mental attitudes are not being
developed by the Egyptian educational system,  most specifically  including  the universities.  In a period
of increasing governmental budgetary austerity, additional resources must be found for basic and
prepatory education; at the same time, truly analytical thinking must be stimulated at all levels of
the educational system: the "ability to deal with disequilibria" must rise if the "export-led growth"
strategy is to succeed.
4 As of this  writing  (May,  1991)  the government  has  neared  agreement  with  the IMF  on a package  of reforms  which
include  some of  these measures.  Specifically,  the exchange  rate  has been  d9valued,  steps toward  unification  of  the
exchange  rate  have  been  taken,  a value-added  tax  is promised,  and  energy  prices  are  to rise  gradually  to world  market
levels.  These  are  hopeful,  albeit  long  overdue,  changes.  Since  'reforms'  and  *agreements  have  been  announced  so
often  in  the past, it remains  to be seen whether  the  changes  are  genuine,  or rather,  as in 1987,  were  simply  a means
to achieve  debt relief  from  the Paris  Club.*6 -
18.  The implications  of the new strategy for higher education policy  are clear: "fewer, but
better". The country already suffers from an excess supply of ill-trained university  degree holders;
at the same, technicians and university  graduates who are thoroughly  trained in analysis  and synthesis
(as opposed to rote-memorization) are very scarce. The direction of higher education policy is clear:
reduce  the quantity of university students and  graduates, redirecting those denied admission to
technical institutes, and simultaneously  to upgrade the quality of education of those who remain in
the universities.  This is now explicit  government policy,  and is entirely sound. Of course, it faces some
difficult constraints, which are discussed in some detail below. Reform in the higher education sub-
sector, as in most areas of the Egyptian economy, has been slow; however, the pace of change in this
sub-sector has arguably been more rapid than in areas such as macroeconomic and industrial policy.
Especially given the daunting nature of the problems, policy makers are to be congratulated on the
skill and courage with which they have been pursuing reforms.
II. HISTORY OF HIGHER  EDUCATION
19.  The policy innovations sketched in the preceding paragraphs can best be understood
if they are placed in historical context. Many of Egypt's educational problems have deep historical
roots. The ancien reL -ne (roughly, 1840-1952)  did little to foster educational development for two
reasons. First, the highly  inegalitarian system of landownership  blocked the wide diffusion  of literacy.
Economic hisiorical research strong'.y suggests that there is an inverse correlation between basic
education and "plantation societies". Whether in Khedivial Egypt or the post-Reconstruction U.S.
South, those with wealth (here, the large landowners) have little or no incentive to agree to tax
themselves so that the level of education of "their" agricultural workforce can be raised. By contrast,
communities of farm owner-operators are much more likely to tax themselves in order to provide
the necessary  public infrastructure for wide-spread  education. The Egyptian land-tenure rystem  which
arose in the 19th century was a major obstacle to the development of human capital. (Richards,
1982; Cochran, 1986; Wright, 1980).
20.  The British occupation did little to  improve matters. Because of their reliance on
methods of indirect rule, the British did nothing to challenge the social dominance of the large
landowners and  their indifference to  mass education. Further,  not only did  the  British reduce
spending on education and impose fees for primary education, but they also shaped the educational
system to  meet  their  own needs, which were  for obedient  governmental clerks. Independent,
analytical thinking by local functionaries was discouraged by British  colonial authorities, who hardly
wanted  Egyptians challenging or  modifying British decisions.' Rote-learning and  memorization
(which fundamentally involves  an acceptance of authority) was the educational means to produce
s 'The less  individuality  and  initiative  shown  by an  Egyptian,  the  more  acceptable  he  was  likely  to be  to the  advisor
whose  duty it was  to train  him  for the bureaucracy'.  (Cochran,  1986,  p. 13).-7-
such personnel.  In addition to retarding the diffusion of literacy (in 1917, after 35 years of British
rule, over 90% of the population was illiterate), such policies had two lasting effects: 1) they created
values which stressed the importance of education as a means to govemment employment, and 2)
they fostered and reinforced a passive, "memorization"  approach to learning. Students advanced by
committing  large  quantities  of  information  to  memory, and  then  repeating  it  verbatim  on
examinations. As we shall see, this remains an acute problem in higher education today, nearly a
century later.
21.  Such stress continued  in the early period of  Egyptian independence, when, for
example, lack of agreement on the combination of traditional and modern subjects to be included
in the secondary curriculum was resolved by including both. The large number of subjects which
students were expected to master left little choice but to memorize and regurgitate. In 1935, the
Ministry of Education issued a report openly criticizing  the role of memorization in education; these
criticisms  are repeated today, including in this report, more than a half-century later.
22.  The pace of educational expansion quickened somewhat in the early independence
period: at the end  of the nineteenth century, about 3.5% of children of primary school age were
enrolled, while by 1930, the number had risen to 18%. Although primary schools were made free in
1936 (secondary schools followed in  1950) (Waterbury, 1983), by 1937, less than  15% of  the
population was literate (less than one-quarter of men and less than 10% of women), with nearly all
progress coming between 1917 and 1927.
23.  It  follows that  universities were  raised on  a  very narrow social base.  The  first
University, the Egyptian National University (later Cairo University) was founded  in  1908, and
became a  public institution in 1925. As a  private institution it had  a liberal arts  focus, offering
courses on economics, philosophy, history, and Arabic literature. Upon its incorporation into the
public sector, it included professional schools, including those of medicine and law. By 1952, there
were only two other institutions of higher education in the country, Alexandria University  (founded
in 1942)  and the American University in Cairo, a private institution founded originally  by Protestant
missionaries. In 1952 Ain Shams university was established; in a pattern often repeated later, this
occurred as an "upgrading"  of a higher training institute (in this case, for secondary school teachers,
and for agricultural and commercial specialists.
24.  The fundamental institutions (and problems) of the modern Egyptian educational
system were created by the government of Gamal Abd-el-Nasser. His policy  innovations were driven
by two concerns: 1) a strong commitment to equity and to expanding the social base of education
in the country and 2) a desire to bolster Egypt's national independence and regional influence, not
only through diplomatic and military means, but also by creating a modern industrial state. Although
much was achieved, particularly in contrast with the nearly inert polices  of the British  and the ancient
regime, the goals of neither equity nor growth were fully  realized, for two reasons: 1) despite rapidexpansion, the rate of population growth accelerated in Egypt as in all developing countries after
World War II and 2) the two goals were often in conflict.
25.  Primary education expanded very rapidly, from about one million in 1952 to nearly
3.5 million in 1965/66, or an enrollment growth rate of just under 9% per year. However, despite
stated, sincere commitments to universal enrollment, one-third of the eligible age-group was still not
enrolled by the  latter date.  The  expansion of. other  educational  sectors was still more  ropid:
prepatory enrollments increased an as'  ni.hing six-fold  in 5 years (from 8,000 to 42,000 from lyo6
to 1961) and secondary  enrollments more than tripled (from 22,000  to 75,000  during the same years).
Inevitably,  educational quality crumbled before the quantitative flood. Quality fell further because
resources were diverted to military activities, and because the government encouraged the expolt of
Egyptian school teachers as a mneans  to enlarge Egypt's influence ir. the Arab world.
26.  The explosion of primary and secondary enrollments set the stage for a huge influx
of the "Nasser  years cohort" into the higher education system in the late 1960s  and 1970s.  The rapid
expansion reinforced the "quality problem", since only rote memorization was possible in the face
of soaring enrollments, tight budgets, and  scarce and  often inadequately trained  teachers. The
allocation of resources to education suffered as a result of the heavy demands of military spending
and the rapid growth of state-led import-substituting industrialization.  This strategy also contributed
to the misallocation of resources within the educational sector, in which funding for lower levels
lagged behind those of higher education. But such a decision was implicit in the state-led import-
substituting strategy, especially  when large numbers of foreign technicians left the country during and
after the Suez Crisis in 1956. The need to replace such technicians and to expand their numbers
fostered a concentration on more advanced levels  of higher education at the expense of the primaiy
level.
27.  The expansion of the universities was greatly stimulated by the abolition of fees,
written into law in 1963. (The large number of non-Egyptian Arab and African students who were
encouraged to study in Egypt further increased enrollments). When combined with the "employment
guarantee"  (see  paragraph  2.11), a  very strong demand  for higher education was thus created:
university  enrollments rose from just over 50,000 in 1952/53  to over 160,000  in 1969/70.  At first, these
students were accommodated within the existing universities of Cairo, Alexandria, and Ain Shams
Universities. Then  "local branches" of  existing universities were created,  and  finally, the  local
branches became autonomous universities. Altl&ough  this process began during the Abd-el-Nasser
government with the establishment of Asyut University  in 1957,  it culminated in a wave of university
founding in the first half of the 1970s (see paragraph 2.13).
28.  The government successfully  channelled students into the pure and applied sciences.
Whereas between 1910  and 1951  Egyptian universities  produced fewer than 5,000  engineers, between
1952 and 1967 nearly 19,000 graduated. By 1971,  some 55% of all university  students were enrolled
in scientific fields. Other  prestigious fields such as medicine saw their enrollments expand lessrapidly- nevertheless, between 1952 and 11967 11,400  MDs were graduated. Agriculture, veterinary
medicine, and other applied fields also increased their share of total enrollments.
(Waterbury, 1983, p. 237).
29.  Despite such increased stress on the natural sciences, the numbers enrolled ini  the
humanities rose sharply. The flood of graduates from these faculties contributed to the creation of
job guarantee, by far the most difficult legacy of the Nasser period for later educational planners.
In 1964 the government promised to employ any university  graduzate  who could not find another job.
Acquiring a university degree became tantamount to obtaining a highly  secure, if modest, life-time
income stream. The private benefits of university  education were enormously increased, at the same
time  as  the  abolition of  fees  dramatically lowered the  private costs. The  demand  for  higher
education, already strongly entrenched for social reasons, shot up.
30.  The social benefits, however, were very different. At first, the government placed
graduates in both the bureaucracy and in public sector companies. Both became grossly  overmanned.
By the late 1970s,  overstaffing in the public sector companies had spawned such a high degree of
inefficiency  in production of basic goods that the companies were freed of their requirement to hire
new workers. (see. e.g., Hansen and Radwan, 1982,  p. 44).6  In contrast, the government bureaucracy
grew rapidly, throughout the 1970s  and early 1980s  from the already high base created in the 1960s.7
The job  guarantee  not  only drove a  large wedge between private and  social returns on  higher
education, but also seriously segmented the Egyptian labor market (Hansen and Radwan, 1982),
contributed to budgetary deficits and macroimbalances, and greatly reduced the efficiency of the
public sector. It also hampered the successful upgrading of the quality of higher education.
31.  During the 1970s  the numerical expansion of university  graduates accelerated as the
"Nasser  years' cohorts" poured into the system in the wake of the expansion of secondary schools:
the growth rate of university  enrollments rose from 7.6% (1952/53-1965/66),  fell to 3.5% (1965/66-
1969/70),  and then leaped up to 14% per year (1971-1977).  To accommodate these numbers, new
universities were created at Tanta  (1972), Mansoura (1972), Zagazig (1974), Helwan (1975), El-
Minya (1976), Minufiyya  (1976), and Suez Canal University  (1976).  However, these universities rarely
were equipped with either the physical or human capital necessary to maintain quality. 8 In many
cases, faculty live in Cairo, adding difficult commutes to already heavy work-loads.
e  Despite  the relaxation  of the formal requirement  for public enterprises  to hire labor, public enterprise  employment
continued to expand:  from just under  one million  In 1976  to 1.2  million  In 1986.  Public  enterprises,  like  the government
bureaucracy  and, Indeed,  all formal  enterprises,  also  faced  severe  restrictions  in firing  workers throughout  the 1980s.
7 Government  employment  expanded  form 1.78  million  in 1976  to 2.57  million  In 1986.
' There  are  notable  exceptions  to  this  generalization,  such  as  the  Agricultural  Economics  faculty  at  Zagazig  Jniversity,
which,  under  the  leadership  of  Ahmed  Gouell,  became  nearly  as  prestigious  as  that  of  Cairo  or Alexandria  University.- 10-
32.  The labor market into which graduates moved was dominated by two developments:
large scale emigration of Egyptians to work in the major oil-eorting  countries, and the continuing
rapid expansion of government employment. The "Dutch Disease"  of the period militated against the
creation of jobs in traded goods sectors, while government policy continued passively  to encourage
govemment employment. The consequences of emigration for the quality of university instruction
were not good, since the most skilled and active faculty members could and did find jobs abroad
which paid salaries as much as fifteen times those available at home. University  administrations were
faced with a difficult challenge of maintaining the continuity of their staff and programs in the face
of high turnover. The wedge between the social and the private rate of return to a university  diploma
widened as the marginal social utility of additional public servants declined.
33.  In conclusion, Egyptian higher education policy makers have inherited a difficult
historical legacy. The  quantity  of  university students  has  long  outstripped  their  quality,  the
educational system as a whole has still failed to keep all 6412  year olds in school; one-half of the
adult population is illiterate. Yet, because of the imperatives of structural adjustment, govemment
spending must fall, and funds need to be reallocated with.n the educational sector. Throughout the
1970s,  the problems were recognized,  but although there were periodic promises to limit enrollments
and to adopt other reforms, nothing of the sort happened. Only in the 1980s have policy makers
finally responded to the increasingly  severe crisis in the higher educational system.
34.  The broad policy response has been very sensible: the government has ceased hiring
university graduates, thereby slowly changing the signals to  families about  the private returns to
higher education. It has reduced the total number of students by raising admissions standards, and
has raised faculty  salaries. Total spending per student has increased, and education receives a higher
percentage of the total government budget. There are on-going attempts to raise quality by fostering
interdisciplinary  programs and by reforming the examination system.
35.  These are very wise moves, and have required considerable courage from policy
makers. Egyptians had become accustomed to regarding higher education as an 'entitlement". The
decision was parti-ularly difficult, because, of course, the numbers of eligible students continued to
increase, thanks to the on-going expansion of secondary education. In 1971, nearly 79,000 students
passed the thanawiyya amma or General Secondary Exam (GSE), the combined secondary school
completion/college entrance examination. Ten years later, the numbers had increased to 143,000,  a
rise  of 80%.  As  one  analyst put  it in  the  early 1980s, just  before  the  reforms  began to  be
implemented, "Any major change in the system now would inevitably catch hundreds of thousands
of families in midstream and  could provoke political resentment similar in its intensity to  that
following  the suspension of some consumer subsidies in January, 1977" (Waterbury, 1983, p. 241).
The government took, and takes, considerable risks in reforming the system.
36.  As we shall see, however, much remains to be done. Despite the increases in overall
spending, the allocation of funds to non-salary spending has fallen, a development which impedes-11  -
creating the conditions within which a more analytical, problem-solving and creative approach to
learning could be possible. But current policies constitute a courageous reversal of at least twenty-
five years of unbridled, ill-conceived  university  expansion.
III. PERFORMANCE AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Ouantities
37.  Total university  enrollments during the past 15 years are shown in Table 1. Several
basic facts are immediately apparent.  1) University  enrollments exploded during the period 1971-
1977, growing at a compound rate of over 14% per year, with the number of students more than
doubling. 2) Growth decelerated  during the following  seven years, 1977-1984,  with enrollments
expanding at about '.4%  per year; by 1984 university enrollments were more than three times as
large as they had been only 13 years earlier! By the mid-1980s,  the number of students was five times
larger than the designed capacity of the universities' facilities. 3) 1984 was a water-shed year, in
which fundamental policy  decisions  were taken and began to be implemented: university  enrollments
have fallen in every year since then, at a compound rate of about -3% per year, by 1989 the total
number of university  students had been reduced by nearly 100,000,  a decline of some 14%.
38.  Most of the expansion in university  enrollments has been in the humanities: the share
of science students in total enrollments fell from over half (55%) in 1971 to just over one-quarter
(26.3%) in 1984 (Table 1). This decline in the percentage of science students has not been reversed
since the policy reforms of 1984: the decline in enrollments has been roughly equally apportioned
between sciences and humanities. Indeed, the percentage of science students in total enrollments
actually fell slightly from 1984 to 1989, to 25.3%.
39.  Several simple observations may be made on these trends. First, the explosion of
enrollments, encouraged by the absence of charges for university  admission and by the govemment
job guarantee, had serious implications for the quality of education. This was especially true during
the 1970s,  when large numbers of faculty members sought, often successfully,  to obtain employment
in the capital-surplus oil exporting countries. Second, such rapid expansion seriously  exacerbated the
difficulties  of the labor market:  the number of graduates rose nearly four-fold between 1973 and
1986 (see Table  2). The fact that  an incr-asing percentage of these graduates were humanities
graduates did not improve their job prospects.
40.  Part of the response to the situation was the attempt to channel secondary school
graduates either  into the job market directly, or into two year technical training institutes. These
were first established in 1973; enrollments expanded from an initial 20,805 in 1973 to 105,360 in
1989.  Unlike university  enrollments, these expanded steadily throughout the two decades (see Table-12-
4). Such schools complement the "technical secondary schools",  whose enrollments are nearly one
million. Graduates from these schools rose steadily, with only a slight dip (1985-86)  (see Table 5).
Such monotonically increasing  enrollments and graduations stand in marked contrast to the situation
in the  universities, and  indicate that at  least to  some extent, policy makers have been able  to
"channel" secondary school graduates into these institutes.
41.  However, there arc important constraints on the demand for such technical education.
First, its quality is too often poor, with, as is true throughout the educational system, most resources
being absorbed by salaries. These nevertheless remain inadequate, and severe shortages of technical
school teachers are reported. This is not surprising: technicians are scarce throughout the economy,
and can command good wages, especially in comparison with those offered by the public sector
(which includes all technical institutes). But the dis-proportional allocation of resources to salaries
has left many institutes ill-equipped, and too often, with equipment and buildings  which are poorly
maintained.  Second, the rapid expansion of  the institutes jeopardized  quality. Some  institutes
operate on a two-shift  system. Third, the demand for university  education is derived not merely from
the job market, but also from considerations of status. Graduates of technical schools feel that their
education  is 'second-class", since it does  not  lead  to  a  bachelor's degree.  Fourth,  such status
considerations also strongly affect the faculty, who, in common with experience elsewhere, 9 seek
to upgrade their institution into a university.  This has happened twice in Egypt, in which the formerly
technical  institutes, designed to  produce technicians, at Benha  and  Helwan were  upgraded to
university status.
42.  Real resources available for higher education have continued to expand throughout
the period. Table 6 shows the trends. First, after an expansion of the share of higher educational
expenditure in GDP from 1.1% to 1.6% from 1980/81  to 1985/86,  the percentage has since dropped
back to its original share  (1.1%) by 1989. However, higher education's share  of the government
budget has continued to expand during the decade, from 2.5% in 1980/81  to 5.1% in 1989/90.  Third,
real expenditure per student has increased nearly six-fold. Fo !rth, this increase has been entirely
absorbed by increases in faculty salaries; the share of salaries rose from 55.7% of higher educational
expenditure at the beginning of the decade to 69.3% by the close of the decade. Total real non-salary
expenditures fell from LE 80 million  in 1980/81  to LE 73.1 million  in 1989/90;  non-salary  expenditure
per student accordingly fell from about LE 158 to LE 129 (in 1980 LE). The consequences of this
development for quality are discussed in the next section.
Quality and Internal Efficiency
43.  The key problem with the quality of university  education in Egypt is the same as that
everywhere: students tend to equate "learning"  with "memorizing".  Consequently, graduates are ill-
See  Clark  (1990)  for a discussion  of a similar  phenomenon  In  the  California  State  University  system.- 13.
equipped with the habits and skills of problem-solving  and synthesis  which are the skills needed for
the modern world. One cannot "respond to disequilibria" in a creative and c'vially useful way by
repeating memorized materials.
44.  Many forces conspire to undermine the quality of higher education and to reduce
learning to a process of memorization. It is sometimes argued that modern Egyptian education more
closely resembles traditional Quranic kuttab (where boys committed the Quran to memory) than is
often appreciated.  British policy rei!zforced this trend (paragraphs 2.2 and  2.3). However, such
historical legacies  provide only a partial explanation. A more fundamental generator of rote-learning
is the paucity of resources at all levels of the educational system. High pupil-student ratios and the
dearth of supplementary materials almost guarantee the reduction of education to memorization:
how else can a primary school teacher control his or her class of 45 pupils? What can a student be
expected to know except what is in the textbook and what the teacher says if these are the only
materials available? If tests are structured to  reflect this situation at the primary and secondary
levels,  who could be surprised that students enter the university  tratined  to mer  Z . e and regurgitate?
Since this is how teachers themselves are trained, who would doubt that the,  .ould use the same
approach  in their own classrooms? If universities themselves have few (and declining) resources
other than faculty members (see paragraph 3.7 above), we should find the continued reliance on
memorization unsurprising. 10
45.  These "supply side" forces have been reinforced on the demand side: if university
graduates have long been bound for the government bureaucracy, where, to put it mildly, the scope
for analysis,  innovation, and creativity is minimal, why  should they learn how to think for themselves?
The job  guarantee  has not only undermined external efficiency of the universities, but  has also
helped to eviscerate the quality of instruction in the universities.
46.  The level of understanding required of many university  students to pass exams is low
by international standards. (See Box 1). The usual procedure for a student is to buy the lecture notes
for a course (typically  offered for sale by the professor himself as a way to supplement his income), 11
and  to  attempt  to  attend  the lectures. One  says "attempt", because in some  faculties, such as
commerce, courses routinely have up to 1,000  students enrolled in a class, and there are usually not
enough  seats  to  go around.  Student responses include arriving three  hours early and  "rotation
systems", in which groups of friends take  turns attending class and  then share  their notes. The
concept of a "syllabus",  with readings other than the textbook, is alinost unheard of in the Egyptian
'0Even  students  who  do  have  access  to alternative  materials,  and  who  attend  much  smaller  classes  tend  to memorize-
and-repeat.  For  example,  professors  at  the AU.C.,  with  a U.S.-style  undergraduate  library  and  class  sizes,  constantly
complain  that, as one put  it, 'my  students respond to tests by 'printing  the  screen':  I 'enter  the data',  and  they 'print
it out'!l
"' The  cost  of notes  varies  with  their  length;  a  set  of  notes  for  a  typical  economics  class  would  cost  between  LE  10  and
20.* 14-
university system. 12 This is understandable:  how or where would students obtain access to sszh
readings and information? The deficiencies  of libraries, fundamentally caused by grossly  inadequate
budgets, prohibit such assignments.
47.  These problems are even worse in the natural sciences and medicine,  where adequate
training demands "hands-on" activities in labs, dissection rooms, etc. The usual result is a stress on
theory at the expense of practice: thus computer students study mathematics, but hardly ever get a
chance actually to use a computer, or medical students study anatomy from books, without ever
dissecting a  cadaver.  It  is possible that  the scientific fields havu suffered the  most  from  the
deterioration in quality spawned by the decline in non-salary  spending per student.  This, of course,
weakens the country's ability to increase its competitiveness in international markets.
48.  Policy makers are acutely aware of these difficulties  and are attempting to respond.
However, they are constrained in several ways. First, there was little doubt that university salaries
had to rise; university  professors were not immune from the deep cuts in public sector real wages.  13
Even today, a full professor at Cairo University makes only LE 300 per month, little more than a
full-time (perhaps illiterate) maid employed by foreigners. If faculty ate inadequately paid, then, of
course,  the  quality of  education  will suffer dramatically:  professors, like  most  public  sector
employees, 'moon-light' extensively,  whether by  selling lecture notes or by taking on consulting  work.
Such activities generate wide-spread absenteeism; it is not uncommon for faculty members to miss
at least one-third of the regularly scheduled class meetings. Even under the best of circumstances,
the effective academic year rarely exceeds twenty weeks. Although this is technically against the
regulations, few administrators can enforce the rules; after all, faculty members have to  make a
living,  and certainly have higher than average expectations and consumption standards. The problem
is especially acute for those faculty members who can obtain posts in the Gulf countries.  Finally, it
is unrealistic to expect anyone to do a job well if he/she is not adequately remunerated.
49.  Further, university  administrators, including  the highest level of the Ministry  of Higher
Education, have no discretion over the allocation of funds between faculty salaries and other areas
of spending. Their budgetary allocations from the Ministry of Finance are 'line item'  budgets, with
funds being non-fungible across categories. Fundamentally, then, the Ministry of Finance is making
decisions which directly impact educational quality. It is highly dubious that this ministry has the
necessary expertise  to  make  the  best  educational  decisions. Experience elsewhere  has  amply
demonstrated  the virtues of greater  university autonomy,  here, as elsewhere  in the  economy,
excessive  centralization of decision making undermines efficiency goals.
12 This does not apply to the private  American  University  in Cairo,  which attempts  to provide  a university  education
conforming  to the American  model.
13 Refai  wages  of government employees  in the late 1980s were only 55% of those  of 1973  (World  Bank, 1991).-15  -
50.  Low salaries and the absence of extra-class materials cani  interact in a "vicious  circle"
to undermine quality and to promote rote-learning. Poorly paid faculty members neglect teaching
for more remunerative activitie.  They have little time or resources for research, and  too often
cannot keep up with developments in their field. They may also sell lecture notes. To maximize the
sales of the latter, they structure their tests so that the notes must be memorized. Students respond
by buying and memorizing  the notes, thus reproducing poorly qualified graduates. They find difficulty
finding jobs, which, given the  continued de  jure job  guarantee, increases the  pressure on  the
government to provide for them in some way.
51.  The lack of university autonomy and strong centralization also removes the "status
competition" which is such a strong motor of change and promoter of quality in the American
system. There is only one private university in the country the AUC, 14 which is closely regulated
by the govemment.  Proposals to  establish additional ones have so far been quashed  on equity
grounds. This issue is taken up in more detail below (paragraphs 3.37-3.38).
52.  In summary, policy  makers in the 1980s  have inherited a very difficult historical  legacy
of  a  university system which provides much higher private  than  social retums.  The  resulting
overcrowding, low salaries, poor facilities, and lack of altemative materials have all conspired to
reduce the educational  process far  too  often to  one of  rote-memorization. The poorly trained
graduates which too often have emerged from this system were for twenty years absorbed into the
government bureaucracy, as they were unable to find better employment.
External Efficiency
53.  The Egyptian higher  education system  suffers from serious external inefficiencies.  The
supply of graduates by the universities  and the demand for their services  by the job market have long
been seriously imbalanced. ThiS  disequilibrium  was both partially created and temporarily concealed
by the government's job guarantee:  by undertaking to hire all graduates, open unemployment of
graduates was averted. However, such a policy  stimulated the demand for higher education, to which
the universities responded by expanding enrollments and graduates. This forced the government to
hire still more  graduates,  creating a  vicious circle which ultimately became  unsustainable for
budgetary reasons. Such a policy also had the serious consequence of reinforcing the segmentation
of the Egyptian labor market.
54.  During  the  twenty-one year  period  1965/66-1986/87  public sector  employment
increased by 373% (Handoussa, 1988, 31). (See Table 7). The wage bill soared:  from 1975 to 1984,
'4This  year  a new  francophone  university  Senghor  University  was  established  In  Alexandria  This  will  be  quite  small,
and  will  draw  most  of  Its  students  from  French-speaking  African  countries.  Appropriately,  it falls  urder  the  authority  of
the Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs,  rather  than  that  of Higher  Education..16  -
wages absorbed an average of 23% of the government's currenv  budget; the numbers shot up to one-
third during 1985-1988  (Handoussa, 1988).  Th'e  consolidated budgtt deficit,  excluding  debt payments,
reached an unsustainable 23% of GDP in 1986; spending cu.s became inevitable. The cuts in the
public sector wage bill were magnified by the fact that two budget categories, interest on the public
debt and military spending, were sacrosanct.
55.  The form of budget cuts had significant implications for graduates and for the long-
run demand for higher education. Because the government chose to reduce the real wage bill in the
public sector by freezing nominal wages and by imposing  a hiring  freeze, adjustment was born by real
wages and  by new  labor  market  entrants.  Both  affect  the  demand  for  higher education:  a
government job is now worth much less than formerly 15, and such jobs are in any case difficult to
obtain.
56.  However, several factors reduce the responsiveness  of prospective university  students
to these policy changes. First, the government suspended the "job guarantee" in practice, but not in
theory. That is, the government simply ceased hiring people; the last class to be hired was the class
of 1984: the "waiting time" has increased from 10 months in 1982 (Sanyal, Nooman, et.al., 1982' to
over seven years today. It is likely that lengthening the government job queue in this way has signaled
prospective university graduates and their families that a university  degree is no longer the route to
a secure, if poorly paying, job.
57.  The message would have been much clearer, however, if the govemment had simply
abolished the guarantee. By leaving it on the books, the government remains responsible for the
employment of graduates. This may lead to various employment schemes of dubious value, such as
the plan to distribute reclaimed agricultural land to graduates. The government is now distributing
more than 150,000 feddans  16 of reclaimed land in the West Nubariyya area  (West of the Delta)
to some 167,000 graduates, of whom roughly 70% have earned  their degrees in non-agricultural
disciplines.  (FAO, 1989) Giving such graduates 6 feddans of fragile soil in an environment requiring
considerable skills and high-technology (e.g., drip irrigation) may threaten  the approximately LE
6,000 per feddan which the GOE  has invested in land reclamation. This example illustrates the
continuing inefficiencies created by maintaining government responsibility for the employment of
university graduates." 7
'5Indeed,  *the average  income  level  of a federal  employee  is only marginally  above  the absolute  poverty  line..  .for the
urban sector., (World  Bank, 1990a,  p. 43).
la 1 feddan =  1.038  acres = .42 hectares
17 In early  May, 1991,  there  were (unconfirmed)  rumors in Cairo that the government  intended  to abolish the de iure
guarantee  as part of the reforms  In the government's  Letter  of Intent  to the I.M.F.  Such rumors are encouraging,  for
if nothing else,  they show that the government  Is at least seriously  considering  making  such a decision.* 17-
58.  The existence  of the de jire  job guarantee also seriously  biases unemployment
statistics  in Egypt. Unemployed  persons  are those  who  register  as such  with the Ministry  v f Labor;
in effect, they are "queueing"  for government  employment.  They must re-register  every twelve
months, and must assert that  they have no other job. Since the country has no system of
unemployment  insurance,  such  individuals  subsist  either  on the largesse  of relatives  or from earnings
in the informal  sector. Gunnar Myrdahl's  telling remark, "Unemrployment  is a bourgeois  luxury"
certainly  applies to Egypt.
59.  Nevertheless,  the problem  of graduate  unemployment  certainly  poses  a challenge  for
the govermment.  Despite  reforms,  the surplus  of graduates  continues  to burden the labor market.
Trends in the composition  of unemployment  are shown in Table 8. The absolute number of
unemployed  university  graduates  has exploded,  rising  from  5,405  in 1960  to 56,693  in 1976  to 236,530
in 1986.
60.  The surpluses  are not confined  to humanities  graduates,  whose  numbers  grew most
rapidly.  Engineering  graduates  from the public  universities,  for example,  often require four  years  to
find a satisfactory  job. This  is in contrast  to the (small)  number  of engineering  graduates  from  AUC,
who seem to have few difficulties  finding  employment.  The difference  may be explained  by the
English  language  facility  and greater non-classroom  materials  available  to students at the AUC.
However,  even they  have  some  difficulties  finding  the type  of job which  they  would  like.  This  appears
to be because many engineering  firms need not so much university  engineers,  whose training is
primarily  in design  (whether  of bridges,  computers,  chemical  processes,  etc.) but rather technicians
who  can implement  and maintain  already  existing  designs.  Quite a few  engineering  graduates  find
themselves  employed  as technicians.
61.  It has been said that Egypt's  most critical  labor shortages  are for the "sergeants  of
industry"--the  technicians  and supervisory  personnel  who  are so essential  to the smooth functioning
of modem industry.  Private sector formal  sector firms  also frequently  complain  of the paucity  of
satisfactozy  "middle  management"  personnel.  Technical  institutes  have  attempted to fill  this gap,  but
so far, they have had mixed  success.  (See paragraph  3.4) Employers  tend to prefer the graduates
of the mixed  secondary/post-secondary  "five  year"  technical  institutes.  Not  only  do the students  in the
latter usually  receive  more practical  training  than those in the two year institutes,' 8 but they also
seem to have a better attitude toward technical  work than their counterparts from the two-year
institutes.
62.  Another  problem  is that technical  training  needs  to be general rather than excessively
specific.  This  is not only  because  technology  and consumer  tastes  can change  swiftly,  but also  because
the current structure  of Egyptian  industry  has little to do with the country's  comparative  advantage
I Five-year  students  receive  about  1750  hours  of  practical  training,  compared  with  about  1200  for  two-year  students- 18 -
as revealed, for example, by domestic resource cost calculations (UNIDO, 198619.  It would do little
good, for example, to expand the supply of technicians careful trained in the details of aluminum
production, when the economic rate of return on this industry is -20% (compared to a financial rate
of return of +12%). The stress at all levels of education should be on developing problem-solving
ability, n_1  on developing excessively  specialized skills.
63.  In the final analysis,  however, the olismatch  between the labor market and the higher
education system is the result of non-educational labor market policies. The failiure  of adequate job
creation in the Egyptian econorry is fundamentally the fault o. the capital-intensity bias of policy and
the failure of growth, in turn caused by the accumulation of debt, by the excessive reliance on
petroleum and remittances, and by macroimbalances and microdistortions.
Equlity
64.  The fundamental equity problem of the higher educaticiaal  system is a common one:
the  inequitably (and  probably also inefficiently) excessive allocation of public  funds to  higher
education at the expense of lower levels.  This problem was especially acute during the 1970s: while
university  enrollments exploded, the school participation rate for children between the ages of 6 and
11 remained approximately stationary at just over 68%. (The rate actually fell for boys during the
decade, from 81.6% in 1970/71  to 77.8% in 1980/81).  The situation improved during the 1980s.  The
increased real resources allocated to primary education during the 1980s  probably has increased the
overall equity of the educational system. It is noteworthy that the absolute number of unenrolled
primary school children decisively  declined during the 1980s; the decline was especially notable for
girls, falling by roughly one-third.
65.  However, a comparison of the budgets of the Ministries of Higher Education and of
Education show a rather different picture (see Table 9). If one assumes that the sum of the two
Ministries' budgets  is a  reasonable  proxy for "educational spending", then  the share  of  higher
education in the total is approximately one-third; an alternative analysis,  combining official  data with
cohort analysis,  suggests that the 10% of the cohort of 1970 in higher education received 50% of all
educational  expenditure. It  is disturbing to  note that,  if anything, the share of total educational
expenditure (defined as the sum of the two Ministries' budgets) allocated to higher education has
increased during the 1980s.
66.  The reason why such allocations are inequitable is the usual one: university  students
rarely come from the lowest i-icome  -brackets. As is true world-wide,the  subsidy to higher education
is a subsidy for the middle-class. An analysis  of the educational cohort of 1970  showed that those in
'l Domestic  resource  cost  calculations  measure  comparative  advantage  by  comparing  the  DRC  ratio  (the  r3tio  of  value.
added  to non-traded  inputs)  to the  (shadow)  exchange  rate.-19.s
the  "upper  income" group  (8% of  the  cohort's  population)  received 14% of  all  educational
expenditure, "middle income" group (67% of the population) received  74% of expenditure, while the
poor (25% of population) received only 12% of expenditure.  Education in Egypt, as elsewhere,
subsidizes the middle and upper classes.
67.  It is difficult to determine the rural-urban equity aspects of higher education, since
no data are available on  the geographical origin of university students. However, some indirect
information may be obtained by looking at the enrollment ratios at the secondary level; there is a
marked 'urban  bias" in such ratios: 61.2% of urban youth of this age are so enrolled, while  only 25%
or  rural youth are enrolled. Since agriculture, the main rural economic activity, is taxed (Dethier,
1989), subsidies to higher education may be construed as a transfer from rural to urban areas, and
hence, as disequalizing.20
68.  Within higher education itself, a principal equity issue is the gender question. Here
some progress appears to have been made during the 1980s. Although women are still a minority
of university  students, they are slightly  better represented now than in the mid-1970s.  (See Table 10)
Women now constitute over a third of all university students; although the absolute numbers of
women students declined along with total enrollments after 1985,  they declined proportionally less
than the numbers of men.
69.  An important equity (and efficiency) issue has been raised in Egypt as elsewhere
concerning charging "user fees" for higher education. Given the generally higher socio-economic
status of most university  students, such a change would be desireable. Indeed, the current structure
of fees (charged for primary, but  not  for higher education) is precisely the opposite of what a
genuine concern for equity would dictate. The problem of change is, as usual, political. Midd'e-class
people are everywhere more vocal and politically  active than the poor. Since many of the "middle
class" people who enjoy university  subsidies are far from wealthy, they feel very threatened by the
prospect of university fees.
70.  This question is linked to another issue which has been publicly discussed but upon
which no action has been taken or is even seriously  contemplated: the creation of private universities.
As previously noted, one such institution already exJcs: the American University in Cairo. Despite
receiving grants and funds from the United States, tuition is high: some US$5,000 per semester,
equivalent to tuition at less-expensi .,  private universities in the United States. Such fef-s  are far
above the means of the vast majority of Egyptian families.  However, enrollments in the AUC have
grown rapidly, and demand  for entrance is strong. It is conceivable tha. other private universities,
charging lower fees than the AUC but more than the public universities, might be able to attract
students and to be self-financing.
X Average  urban  incomes  are  about  46%  above  rural  averages.  (World  Bank,  1991,  p. 11).-20-
71.  The advantages and disadvantages of such a policy initiative  are well-known.  On the
one hand, such institutions could take some of the pressure off of the public universities and could
offer, presumably, higher quality education through higher faculty salaries, smaller class sizes, and
greater  provision of library, laboratory and other "extra-classroom"  materials. However, there  is
considerable fear in Egypt that  this might create a "two-tiered" educational system, in which the
private schools offered superior education to the well-to-do, leaving the poorer students with an
inferior education.
72.  Such fears are likely misplaced. Such a dual system already exists. In general, the
current educational system is inequit able because it is (relatively) biased against primary education.
More specifically,  a "two-tiered"  system already exists at the secondary level:  wealthier parents send
their children to private schools, especially  those offering instruction in foreign languages (English,
French, German). Finally, the "tutorial system", prevalent at both the secondary and also at the
university  level,  gives an additional advantage to families  with greater resources. The hiring of private
tutors greatly improves the chances of a student's receiving a high mark on the General Secondary
Exam, and therefore, of his or her access not only to the university,  but also to the more prestigious
faculties such as medizine. Private tutoring continues at the university  level; the practice seems to
have begun in medical schools, and then to have spread to other disciplines. The outcome is the
same as at the secondary level: those who can pay receive superior instruction and achieve better
results. Consequently, and in common with most countries, the current structure of education, while
offering some important avenues for social upward mobility, by and large reproduces the existing
class structure. little  would be lost by explicit recognition of this fact.
73.  In summary, reforming the system of higher education subsidies is essentially  one of
finding an  appropriate  targeting mechanism. The  most  common such system world-wide is a
combination of fees with scholarships for the  needy. A difficulty in  Egypt is that  the  popular
perception of government competence is unflattering. It  is widely assumed that  any scholarship
system would in practice reward the well-connected, rather than the talented-but-poor. Accordingly,
many believe that a system of "targeting"  in higher education would indeed exclude the less well-off,
however able  and  motivated  they might be.  The  problem of  increasing the equity of  higher
education cannot  be divorced from the political problem of the public's negative perception of
governmental administrative capacity.
Summarv: Determinants of Performance
74.  The determinants  of the  performance of the higher educational  system may be
summarized in a supply-and-demand framework, with due attention given to the impact of policy on
both  aspects of  the  market.  On  the supply side, the fundamental  problem  is one  of quality:
university students too rarely are trained to analyze, synthesize, and solve problems. Instead, they
leam  to  memorize and regurgitate lecture notes. Needless to say, such graduates have not  been*21.
taught to "respond rapidly to disequilibria".  The causes of such a supply problem are: 1) very large
class sizes, 2) low faculty salaries, which encourage absenteeism and the selling of lectture notes to
supplement  income, and  above all, 3) the inadequacy of non-class materials (libraries, assigned
readings, laboratories, computers, etc.) which are indispensable if students are to learn analytical
thinking.
75.  Such problems reflect the paucity of resources in the higher education system. This,
in turn, is policy generated. Since education is free, all resources must come from the government
budget. Since the budget is chronically and catastrophically in deficit, there is great pressure to
reduce spending. Creditably, Egypt has avoided reducing real resources allocated to education.
However, the decline in the allocation of real resources to non-salary items blocks any program to
improve quality.
76.  The absence of fees also greatly increases the demand for higher education. Students
attend the university  hoping to improve their life-time earnings; this has been strongly reinforced by
the government job guarantee. Implementing this policy,  combined with the absence of fees, greatly
increased the  private return  to  higher education. Although the government has not  hired new
graduates for over six years, the fact that the guarantee has not been explicitly  and legally  repudiated
continues to send socially  wasteful signals to prospective university  students and their families. The
government's program to grant reclaimed land to graduates is likely to reinforce such signals.
77.  Government policy has very likely succeeded in reducing the private rate of return
to education, not only by lengthening the waiting time for a government job (or allocation of land),
but also by reducing real wages in the bureaucracy. Yet despite such falls, university enrollments
exploded in the 1970s;  the decline of the late 1980s  was not the result of slackening demand, but was
ckaused  by government-mandated enrollment limitations.  The demand for higher education in Egypt
seems quite inelastic with respect  to either  the availability or the  remuneration of government
employmenit.
78.  There are at least two reasons for such demand inelasticity.  First, demand for higher
education may be counater-cyclical:  if it is difficult to  find work which is congruent with the job
seeker's aspirations, then staying in school is a reasonable strategy, particularly given its low cost.
Although government wages declined more rapidly than those elsewhere in the economy, real wages
in the last five years have declined throughout the economny  and quality jobs are increasingly  scarce.
The continued strong demand for higher education may be very much a response to the poor labor-
market prospects of most graduates.
79.  A second source of the inelasticity  of demand for college education with respect to
real wages in government (or indeed elsewhere) is that the derived demand for university  education
is based not only on the job market but also on the "marriage market". White-collar work has great
prestige in Egypt; manual labor has a distinctly lower status. Accordingly,  fam.iies are reluctant to.22  -
marry their daughters to men who work with their hands. The "effendi syndrome', democratized
under Abd-el-Nasser,  reduces the responsiveness  of the demand for higher education to labor market
signals.  One would expect such norms to change over time; there is already some anecdotal evidence
that, at least among the lower middle-class,  the higher earnings of private sector skilled workers (e.g.,
plumbers, electricians) relative to government employees has increased the attracti" eness of the
former in the marriage market. Such social norms, however, change only slowly,  and contribute to
the very strong demand for higher education.
IV. CONCLUSION: RESPONSES AND REFORMS
The Government
80.  Government policy strongly shapes both the demand and supply sides of the higher
education market. Policies may  be divided into the direct and indirect: the former are explicit "higher
education policies", while the latter include government budgetary decisions and, especially, labor
market and employment regulations. In general, far more change has occurred with the former than
with the latter.
81.  The government responded to the unsustainable rate of growth in higher educational
enrollments by restricting entrance; this was done by raising the scores required to pass the GSE or
thanawiyya  al-amma. The reduction in the number of students was  combined with an increase in total
real  resources to  higher education. These, however have been  spent  almost entirely on  raising
salaries; such a decision was taken by the Ministry of Finance, which makes 'line item" allocations
to the Ministry of Higher Education. It was certainly necessary to raise salaries; even now, they are
far too low to promote quality instruction. But the paucity of non-salary resources seriously impedes
upgrading the quality of instruction and trailing.  Nevertheless, the increase in real resources per
student  is certainly a step  in the right direction. It is also notable that  this was achieved under
increasingly  severe governmental budgetary constraints.
82.  The  government's de  facto suspension of the  government job  guarantee  is also
helpful. Arguably, it is inadequate. Its de jure  existence continues to send the wrong signals to
prospective students  and creates considerable pressure on the government to provide alternative
employment for graduates. Thus, rather than simply recognizing and publicizing the fact that the
government cannot temain responsible for providing  jobs for graduates, the GOE tries to provide
jobs for them by using some of its resources from outside of the bureaucracy. Schemes such as the
distribution of reclaimed land to graduates continues to signal prospective university  students that
"the government will provide" if you have a degree. It would be  far better  simply to  cancel the
guarantee outright.-23  -
83.  Changes in government policy have not had a perceptible impact on increasing the
equity of the educational system as a whole. The fundamental weakness remains the disproportionate
allocation of resources to higher education at the expense of primary education. It is not unnecessary
to assume, of course,that funds for one need come at the expense of the other; there are many  other
budgetary allocations (particularly, those covering the losses  of state-owned enterprises) which could
be cut to free resources for greater human capital investment. However, if a fixed budget for all
educational  expenditures  is assumed,  the  current  allocation is  not  only inequitable,  but  also
inefficient: primary schooling  has a far higher social rate of return than does higher education, while
the "quality  problems" encountered in the university  are partly created by deficiencies in pre-tertiary
education.
84.  The  Achilles Heel of  government policy toward  higher education  is the  many
impediments to job creation. The list of Egyptian "anti-employment policies" is long and familiar:
overvalued  real  exchange  rates,  negative  real  interest  rates  (both  partially caused  by  huge
government deficits), very low energy prices, output price distortions, and a regulatory environment
which not only impedes the growth of private traded goods production but also tum labor into a
fixed cost. The rate of change in these policies is very slow;  with a labor force growing at 2.7% per
year, the problems of university  students' finding  jobs will only become increasingly  severe, despite
restrictions on enrollments.
Employers
85.  Private sector employers have relatively few direct links to the universities. Legally,
the govemment has a monopoly on all job placements. In practice, some  limited private sector
placement is tolerated; there are occasional "job fairs" (e.g., at A.U.C.) and a few private sector job
placement services operate  near Cairo University.  Formal private sector companies also maintain
informal networks of personnel managers, who share information on needs, salaries, etc. Such groups
as, for example, the Overseas Security Advisory Council, largely composed of foreign firms, share
such information. The informal sector, of course, requires few services of university graduates as
such; many graduates are employed in this sector, since they cannot find altemative employment.
Recruitment here is through personal ties, word-of-mouth, etc. In short, formal and even informal
linkages between private sector hiring and the universities are very limited.
Students
86.  Students seem to have responded sluggishly  to the new conditions. More students are
attending technical schools, but this may simply be the result of the lack of alternatives given the
increasing restrictiveness of university admission policies. There is little evidence that the demand-24 -
for higher education has slackened significantly;  the very slow  change in "marriage market" conditions
offers a plausible explanation for this phenomenon.
Universities
87.  Despite  the  low  level  of  autonomy  of  decision  making  power  of  university
administrators, a number of innovative  responses are observable. Responses here include the attempt
to  upgrade  textbooks, to  increase  reliance on  "self-teaching" materials, and  to  develop a  few
innovative  programs which  stress greater student initiative,  problem-solving,  and practicality  (See Box
2). It is planned to separate the college entrance examination from the secondary  school completion
exam, and to change the content of the exam. It is already possible to substitute the U.K's  A-level
examination for the GSE. Officials at both the universities and the Supreme Council would like to
increase the allocation of resources to non-salary  areas, but they are tightly  constrained by the budget
given them by the Ministry of Finance.*  25.
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TABLE 1: HIGHER  EDUCATIONAL ENROLLMENTS
YEAR  NUMBER OF STUDENTS  % SCIENCE*
ENROLLED  STUDENTS
1971  191,483  55.0%
1972  213,370  52.8
1973  254,537  48.7
1974  301,325  45.7
1975  348,984  43.7
1976  418,932  41.4
1977  452,027  39.7
1978  473,426  39.1
1979  482,334  37.6
1980  505,081  36.2
1981  555,970  33.3
1982  598,251  29.4
1983  643,034  26.9
1984  660,357  26.3
1985  649,140  25.8
1986  636,684  25.7
1987  609,500  26.5
1988  585,447  25.9
1989  567,682  25.3
*  Science students' defined as enrolled in the Faculties of:
Natural  Sciences,  Medicine  and  Pharmacology,  Nursing,
Engineering,  Agriculture,  Veterinary  Medicine,  Technology,
Electronics,  Physical Training,  Applied  Arts,  Cotton  Science,
Petroleum and Mining, and Construction Planning.
Source: CAPMAS.28
TABLE 2: HIGHER  EDUCATION GRADUATES
YEAR  HUMANITIES  SCIENCES  TOTAL
1973  14,859  15,587  32,401
1974  19,672  17,029  39,194
1975  23,532  17,542  44,407
1976  28,425  19,522  51,927
1977  37,002  20,875  62,329
1978  39,268  23,502  65,632
1979  43,223  25,327  72,389
1980  43,239  26,324  73,848
1981  47,111  29,166  77,989
1982  52,966  30,609  82,796
1983  56,874  30,878  87,540
1984  70,500  29,830  100,305
1985  80,582  30,666  111,281
1986  82,889  29,805  113,070
1987  78,580  30,699  107,254
1988  75,032  30,181  103,369
1989  70,004  28,674  95,734
Source: CAPMAS29
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF STUDENTS PASSING THE GENERAL
SECONDARY EXAM
YEAR  SCIENCE  MATH  ARTS  TOTAL
1971  56,485  22,376  78,861
1972  64,544  ----  29,444  93,988
1973  74,564  ----  33,093  107,657
1974  87,340  ----  36,918  124,258
1975  83,759  ----  38,290  122,049
1976  73,719  ----  33,360  107,079
1977  61,378  17,995  38,360  121,482
1978  56,680  22,769  39,101  118,550
1979  55,493  27,362  46,010  128,865
1980  57,579  34,401  51,402  143,382
1981  54,777  34,277  53,930  142,984
1982  53,250  36,920  53,380  143,550
1983  54,731  38,801  54,115  147,647
1984  55,850  36,629  64,312  156,791
1985  56,386  36,771  64,123  157,280
1986  71,340  45,050  71,199  187,589
1987  52,545  34,541  59,008  146,094
1988  54,317  29,718  63,146  147,181
1989  45,662  22,460  65,873  133,995
Source:  CAPMAS30





















TABLE 5: GRADUATES FROM TECHNICAL INSTITUTES




















TABLE 6: SPENDING ON HIGHER  EDUCATION
YEAR  REAL SPENDING  %SALARIES  %OTHER**
PER STUDENT*
1980/81  331.06  55.7%  40.54
1981/82  405.34  59.04  37.29
1982/83  467.87  62.52  33.75
1983/84  573.45  61.63  35.38
1984/85  735.63  64.40  32.22
1985/86  834.23  64.94  29.32
1986/87  1038.16  66.97  24.76
1987/88  1436.04  67.44  24.57
1988/89  1684.98  72.30  22.91
1989/90  1951.36  69.30  22.29
Source: Worled  Bank, 1990b.
*1980 LE
-*Subsidies and Supplies33
TABLE 7:  GOVERNMENT* EMPLOYMENT
YEAR  INDEX  NUMBERS OF
EMPLOYEES
1960  72  670,000
1966  100  933,000
1967  111  1,034,000
1968  118  1,103,000
1969  122  1,135,000
1970  127  1,188,000
1971  134  1,250,000
1972  138  1,291,000
1973  158  1,471,000
1974  178  1,661,000
1975  182  1,701,000
1976  191  1,779,000
1977  205  1,911,000
1978  221  2,065,000
1979  238  2,216,000
1980/81  265  2,474,000
1981/82  283  2,645,000
1982/83  306  2,850,000
1983/84  323  3,015,000
1984/85  344  3,205,000
1985/86  360  3,329,000
1986/87  373  3,480,000
Source: Handoussa (1988), p. 31.
*General government plus economic enterprises.34
TABLE 8: EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNEMPLOYED
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  YEAR
1960  1976  1986
Illiterate  45.8%  23.6%  3.0%
Literate  29.7  11.0  22.0
Primary and
Less than Secondary  3.4  7.9  3.0
Intermediate and
Less than University  17.4  35.0  57.0
(Over Secondary)  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (5.0)
(Secondary)  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (52.0)
University  3.2  9.6  16.0
Unspecified  0.4  12.9  0
Sources: 1960, 1976: Osman and Sobhi (1989), p. 193;
1986: World Bank (1990b), p. 51.35
TABLE 9: SHARE OF HIGHER  EDUCATION SPENDING
IN TOTAL EDUCATIONAL SPENDING












Source: World Bank (1990b).
*Share=  Budget of MOHE as percentage of combined
budgets of MOHE and the Ministry of Education36
TABLE 10: FEMALE ENROLLMENT IN UNIVERSITIES
YEAR  NUMBER OF WOMEN  % OF ALL STUDENTS
ENk;LLED
1976  124,934  29.8
1977  136,178  30.1
1978  141,835  30.0
1979  149,077  30.9
1980  158.036  31.3
1981  181,580  32.7
1982  195,409  32.7
1983  205,633  32.0
1984  215,G79  32.6
1985  215.754  33.2
1986  215,129  33.8
1987  209,875  34.4
1988  203,068  34.7
1989  198,202  34.9
Source: CAPMAS37
BOX 1: UNIVERSITY EXAMS: THE CASES OF ECONOMICS AND GEOLOGY
Egyptian university  students often simply  memorize and repeat the basic principles of a field
of inquiry which they have learned  in lectures and/or from a textbook. Far too seldom are they
challengeel  to apply what they have learned to a simulated "real world"  situation or problem. The fact
that the only measure of students' performance is one, end-of-the-year exam is also deleterious to
developing the kind of problem-solving  skills which the country requires: problem-solving  is a day-in,
day-out practice, not a once-for-all exercise. It is a state of mind, not a once-a-year experience.
For example, consider  the  following exam, for first year economics students  at  Cairo




Explain, by drawing if possible, the difference between:
1)  the marginal propensity to save and the average propensity to consume;
2)  the change in demand and the change in the quantity demanded;
3)  economic growth and economic stagnation;
4)  absolute inequality and absolute equality in the distribution of income.
Part II
Answer only two of the following:
1)  Define  the  consumer's equilibrium for  two commodities, x and  y. What  is the
equilibrium condition? What effect does an increase in the price of commodity x have
on that equilibrium?
2)  Explain--by  drawing--the effect that autonomous investment has if added to the total
demand on the equilibrium level of national income. And explain the effect that such
investment has on savings after the new equlibrium.
3)  Suppose that  two substitutes (rice and macaroni) are in equilibrium. Explain the
effect of an increase in the subsidy for the production of rice has on both the price
and quantity of rice and macaroni.
This  is a  three-hour  exam, in  Arabic, and  constitutes  the only measure  of a  student's
performance after one whole year of concentrated study of economics. However, these question do
little more than ask for basic definitions, or for the most rudimentary application of fundamental
economic principles. Question 11-1,  for example, might appear as one question on a mid-term exam
during the first semester in an American university; such a question would be only a small fraction
of a typical microeconomics midterm, requiring perhaps five minutes to answer. The "meat" of the38
exam would consist of considerably more complicated problems. An American student would also
not typically  be studying only economics at this stage of his/her academic career; nevertheless, the
testing to which he/she would be subjected would be far more difficult.
These problems of testing simply  reflect (and reproduce) the problems of quality discussed
in the text: lack of alternative materials, previous training of students (and faculty), custom, large
class sizes, etc. They are found in many other fields and universities  as well.  Indeed, Cairo University
is the oldest and most prestigious of the universities; its economics faculty contains several world-
class scholars; obtaining admission to this faculty is difficult.  If this prestigious and highly  competent
faculty has such a problem, the situation is very likely to be even worse elsewhere in the higher
education system.
Much the same can be said of other  disciplines. For example, consider the case of the
following  1 1/2 hour final exam in Ore Minerology (for a fourth-year student of geology at Cairo
University,  May, 1988).
"Answer 2 questions only from the following  (illustrate your answers):
1.  Draw  the  TiO2,  FeO,  Fe203  triangle  to  show  the  possible  continuous  and
discontinuous solid solutions referring to one of each in detail and giving  examples
from Egypt.
2.  Discuss four of the following:
a.  Modern and classical methods of polishing;
b.  polishing hardness and microhardness (VHN);
C.  Reflection and bi-reflexion;
d.  Microchemical and etching tests;
e.  Apllications of ore-microsropy in mineral technology.
3.  Compare and contrast between four of the following  pairs:
a.  Replacement and ex-solution textures;
b.  Colloform textures and crustification bonding;
c.  Relict and caries textures;
d.  deformation bonding and translation twinning;
e.  internal reflections and anisotropism."
This author has no expertise whatsoever in geology,  nevertheless, to his naive eye, this exam,
like the one in economics, fails to test the student's ability to apply knowledge to problems. Instead,
he/she is asked to very general questions, which largely test whetl,er the student has memorized the
lecture notes.39
BOX 2: SOME INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUALITY PROBLEM
There now exist  several innovative,  interdisciplinary  programs at several Egyptian universities.
These programs are specifically  designed to increase the 'external efficiency"  of university training
by being more practically oriented than the usual program. In particular, the stress is on solving real
world problems; since such problems often have dimensions which transcend academic disciplinary
boundaries, students are encouraged to take some courses in related areas. (This is similar to the
concept of a "minor' in American universities;  the concept does not exist in Egyptian universities).
Further, since some basic principles may apply to more than one field, students with different areas
of concentration come together in one classroom.  It is hoped that this will increase their interaction,
and also further promote a stress on application of principles.
For example the Insttitute of Graduate Studies and Research at Alexandria University  has
instituted  four  interdisciplinary, post-graduate  programs. Faculty and  students  remain  in  their
respective departments, but come together in certain "group' classes and activities. The groupings
are:
1)  materials--which  includes faculty and students from physics,  chemistry, engineering,
dentistry, and orthopedics;
2)  environmental  studies--with participants  from  science,  engineering, economics,
administration, and law;
3)  bioscience and technology;,
4)  information studies.
The  program at present  has about  150 students.  Success stories include architects who,
through participation in program #2,  have become qualified city planners, and geology graduates
who, by a  pursuing a course of  study in information studies, have become  adept  at computer
applications in geology.
An early version of such an  approach  to higher education was pioneered  by the Cairo
University Faculty of Agriculture at the Fayoum Campus. Students from various disciplines are
brought together, and trained  through seven "course modules", which stress the mastery through
application of fundamental agricultural principles. Students are tested not merely at desks, but also
in labs and in the field. New materials such as work-books,  video-tapes, slides and other visual aids
are  utilized. Such a case illustrates the fundamental argument of the  text that extra-classrooom
resources are essential to the development of such a "hands-on"  method of teaching, which, in turn,
develops the kind of problem-solving ability which the country needs.
The Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University have recently made a
joint proposal (with the Department of the same name at the American University in Cairo) for a
master's degree program in public policy analysis  (including diplomacy and management). Like the
other programs, this one aims to draw on different disciplines and to be closely linked with practical
experience and field-work.40
Finally, the Faculty of Medicine at Suez University has been able to overcome the usual
problem in Egyptian medical training of the lack of clinical experience. This has been achieved by
a  drastic limitation on the  number of students admitted, and  by a substantial augmentation of
resources, provided to the university  by the local governorate. The success  of this program illustrates
the argument of the text: greater non-faculty resources per student are essential if quality is to be
raised. Students not only receive more faculty attention, more clinical training, but also go abroad
for three years of training, which is sponsored by Suez University.  The model of developing links  with
overseas institutions (here, teaching hospitals) could be profitably emulated by other innovative
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